

# Summaries of Individual Contributions

## *1.1. On a collision course: US world order policy after the election of Donald Trump (Florian Böller and Lukas D. Herr)*

Donald Trump's positions on foreign policy and security are casting doubt on the traditional basic orientations of the US which have guided the world power's actions since the Second World War. The new US President has broken with the core idea that the US should play a leadership role within a "liberal world order", "America First" emphasizes the prioritizing of American interests ahead of costly involvement as an international stabilizing power. For Donald Trump, unilateral measures and bilateral ad hoc agreements are the preferred means for a new foreign policy focused on national interests and sovereignty. Despite obvious contradictions in the stances taken by Trump, it seems clear that the focus on short-term gains instead of long-term advantages may test the resilience of the system of multilateral institutions and the cooperative approach to overcoming global problems.

## *1.2. The US under Trump: Potential consequences for transatlantic relations (Peter Rudolf)*

Trump's assumption of office represents a break with the hegemonic internationalist consensus in US foreign policy. In programmatic terms a world power policy oriented purely to the national interests and threat perceptions of the US is becoming evident; anti-international, but not anti-militaristic. In view of the consolidation of the strong role of the office of president and the internal affairs priorities of the Republicans, it can clearly be seen that this new orientation is capable of being implemented, at least in some areas. The undermining of the existing international order arising from this confronts German foreign policy with the task of adopting a level-headed and carefully considered strategic approach to the US, especially in relation to an independent European position, the strengthening of international institutions, a new discourse on regulatory policy and the question of "hard and soft balancing".

## *1.3. International rule of law and international humanitarian law under pressure (Thilo Marauhn and Judith Thorn)*

Doubts about the effectiveness of international law have become fashionable; *jus contra bellum* and *jus in bello* seem to be under considerable pressure. Some states are trying to redefine the limits of the international rule of law. But current international challenges show that the central norms of international law are by no means disintegrating. High expectations in the 1990s overestimated the substantive, procedural and process-related scope of international law – and demanded too much of it. A higher level of cooperation among states is desirable from the point of view of peace policy, but excessively rapid further development of international law can cast doubt on its viability. Current problems can thus be understood as "back to normal", which is cause for some disappointment but not for fundamental doubt concerning the ability of the system of international law to function.

*1.4. Is the EU finished as a force for peace? (Matthias Dembinski)*

Massive external challenges and internal disunity are shaking the foundations of the EU. How can it reconstitute itself so that it can be effective as a force for peace even under changed conditions? Since the EU can no longer leave its security to the US, it needs to make joint security and defense a higher priority, including the coordination of armament policy. Because of the legitimation problem, this must involve intergovernmental development of European security and defense policy. The new proposals for this and the guiding principle of resilience in foreign policy affairs are on the right track. The more the EU can improve the security of its Member States and the protection of its external borders, the more visible its added value to the citizens of the European states will become.

*1.5. A new escalation in Europe or opportunities for common security? (Götz Neuneck)*

Since the Ukraine crisis, relations between NATO and Russia have been strained to an extent not seen for a long time. In Europe an arms race has been set in motion again. Arms control treaties crucial to European security are being eroded and there is a looming threat of increased conventional and nuclear rearmament. The demand by the US that all NATO allies increase their arms expenditures to two percent of gross domestic product is contributing to this. But the dominant rearmament, deployment and deterrent logic cannot on its own guarantee security. To avoid further rearmament, renewed divisions or even major armed conflict in Europe, paths to greater *common security* must be pursued and arms control and disarmament revived.

*1.6. Regional rivalries in the Middle East (Henner Fürtig)*

The Middle East is a region rife with conflicts, in which regional powers are competing for control. Public attention is focused on the role of the great powers such as the US or Russia. But the role Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel or Iran have been playing for a long time is also of great significance. In addition, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is perpetuating many aspects of the Cold War under a different name. Syria in particular has become a war zone in the regional competition for power. However, most probably none of the regional powers will be able to establish itself in a generally accepted leadership role. Since the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq the Western nations have also become more reticent to once again assume a leadership role by making massive commitments.

*1.7. Populists in Europe and an authoritarian International against democracy (Bruno Schoch)*

In politics and the media, “populism” is currently being used in an inflationary and pejorative manner. In the specialist literature, among other things their anti-pluralist claim to sole representation, their friend-foe polarization and their false concretization of abstract, poorly understood social interconnections are regarded as the definitive characteristics of populists; in addition, they emphasize a regressive social utopia of safety and security in national unity by contrast with globalization and, above all, the

shortcomings of the EU. Autocratic Russia, which no longer sees itself as a “managed democracy”, but now operates openly as the counterforce against the Western democracies, which are vilified as decadent, is supporting populists in the West in order to sow the seeds of discord in the EU. This poses a threat to two peace-policy achievements: liberal democracy with its rights of freedom, and European unity. Both must be defended.

*1.8. Flight and combating the causes of flight (Markus Rudolf)*

The Global South is affected far more by violence and flight than the North. Western security policy and measures to restrict the causes of flight are based on unreflected assumptions about political and economic modernization. The recurring violence in Iraq shows how international actors can make the security situation worse, for political models cannot be imposed from the outside. Alternative developmental pathways and corruption confront the EU and the community of nations with ongoing challenges. The repatriation of refugees is part of the business model and survival strategy of kleptocratic rulers. In cooperation with the governments of their countries of origin, human rights and the protection of minorities should not be treated as of secondary importance.

*2.1. Prospects for peace negotiations in Afghanistan? (Nicole Birtsch)*

That the Taliban cannot be defeated by military means and that a political solution is needed in Afghanistan is less and less disputed internationally; within the country the picture is contradictory. Former president Karzai had called on the Taliban to lay down their weapons and reintegrate themselves; the current president, Ashraf Ghani, is trying to open channels for negotiations with the Taliban and integrate the region into a peace process. At the same time, the fighting is continuing, including with the help of international forces. The agreement made with *Hezb-e-Islami* in 2016 contains points which could also play a role in negotiations with the Taliban: renunciation of violence and recognition of the constitution, amnesty and reintegration of fighters, political participation. What are the interests of the Taliban, the Kabul leadership and the civilian population? What are the prospects for negotiations and what underlying conditions would have to be achieved?

*2.2. Peace through the transformation of conflict – The Colombian Experience (Sabine Kurtenbach)*

A spectrum of peace concepts ranging from minimalist to maximalist underlies the debate about possible mechanisms for ending war and promoting peace. Peace is a permanent and non-linear process of negotiation between different societal actors, at the beginning of which stands the ending of collectively organized violence at the local and national level. Establishing constructive forms of conflict transformation is of central importance. In the case of the complex Colombian sequence of violent events, the conflict dynamics are based on the political and economic development model of the country. The various attempts to end the military conflict and transform it by means of agreements and reform processes show that small-format peace initiatives,

individual and flexible reform programs and continuous implementation are fundamental instruments for such a process.

### 2.3. *Local ceasefires in Syria (Samer Araabi and Leila Hilal)*

So far all initiatives aimed at ending the war in Syria have failed. However, in a large number of locations the warring parties, mostly opposition forces and government security personnel, have succeeded in agreeing upon local truces. In all cases, civil society actors were involved as a link between the two sides and as the voice of the population in the areas involved. The ceasefires did not have the potential to bring about widely applicable or sustainable conflict transformation. But no arrangement at the national level will be sustainable if it is not accompanied by inclusive arrangements at the regional and municipal level, which cover the influence of conflict-promoting economic stimuli, external influence, and the precarious imbalance between militarized groups and civil society.

### 2.4. *Between the Jordan and the Mediterranean: Alternatives to occupation and endless war (Margret Johannsen)*

The talk of a two-state solution is coming more and more to resemble a mantra. The territorial reality suggests the emergence of a single state, dominated by the Jews and lacking democratic legitimacy based on international law. Further development towards a single state will cause a dilemma for the Israeli self-image as simultaneously a Jewish and a democratic state. The Palestinians are split internally over the pathway to their own state, and political impetus can scarcely be expected from the external mediators, the US and the EU. Alternatives to a two-state solution involve the model of a binational state with the development of an Israeli nationality, various confederation models as a fusion of two-state and single-state status, and the concept of equal human and civil rights in a single but Jewish-defined state. At the same time, Palestinian grassroots initiatives are developing new forms of resistance.

### 2.5. *Practical implementation of prevention: Banning violence, protecting people (Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Philipp Rotmann)*

How can Germany be equal to the task of reacting “earlier, more decisively and more substantially” to avoid violence? Early recognition should identify forerunners of atrocities occurring in terms of language, culture and the media, and coordinate the variety of sources of information in at-risk countries, military and police intelligence services and the knowledge of development aid personnel. Wherever the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the AU or the ICC are blocked or delegitimized, alternative forms of diplomacy should be used and those regional and great powers having a basic interest in reducing violence should be involved. The application of military compulsion should be integrated into the repertoire of mission planning and military and police training, so that people in need of help can be protected effectively.

2.6. *Are international sanctions helpful? (Michael Brzoska)*

Sanctions have a communication and a material dimension. In setting their goals it is necessary to distinguish among compulsion, restriction and signal sanctions. Sanctions policy should be flexible in order to be able to respond positively to concessions by the party being sanctioned or to respond to avoidance and counter-strategies. The embedding of sanctions in a network of communications involving sanctioning and sanctioned parties is of great significance. The EU sanctions against Iran, Myanmar and Russia show how complex the effects of sanctions are and how greatly they depend on other measures and developments. For all types of sanctions, credibility and improved communications increase the prospects of success, while periodic updating of assessments of the success of the sanctions is important. In the case of Minsk-II, the kind and extent of existing sanctions against Russia should be altered to match Russia's behavior.

2.7. *Between global consensus building and blinkered nationalism: The significance of the UN sustainability agenda for peace (Lothar Brock and Corinna Hauswedell)*

With the adoption in 2015 of the UN Agenda 2030 (Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs) and the Paris Climate Agreement, the community of states has agreed upon a program of cooperation for global public goods. Is this anything more than mere symbolic politics in a world plagued by crises, uncertainty and war? What is the productive link between sustainability and peace agendas? Cooperative handling of diverging (and common) interests in the area of climate and environmental protection can provide new impetus for a fairer world economic order, and in this way promote a reflective approach to violent conflicts and their causes. Germany and the EU should treat the implementation of the agenda as an opportunity to take action against national self-centeredness.

2.8. *Islamist terrorism in Europe (Jochen Hippler)*

Since the 1970s, terrorism from the Middle East has been part of the European security discourse. It was already "Islamized" before September 11, 2001, but the actual number of attacks and victims and the perception of threat differ significantly. In the last two years the situation has worsened: "Home-made" terrorism by perpetrators who were born in Europe or at least grew up in Europe has joined with the "imported" variety, which has its origins in uprisings and civil wars in the Middle East. The combination has caused a higher level of fear about these threats. Combating terrorism must involve acting against both sources of violence: home-made terrorism just as much as imported. To do this, different strategies are needed which, in order to be successful, must not be restricted to repressive or military measures.

2.9. *The challenge of Salafism in Germany – what is to be done? (Janusz Biene, Christopher Daase, Julian Junk, Harald Müller)*

Salafism and the jihadi movement constitute central challenges to German society. Even more than Salafist activities, terror attacks and young jihadists traveling to Syria

and Iraq are contributing to a perception of being under threat. Consequently, public discourse and the political measures adopted do not do justice to the heterogeneity of Salafist movements. Rhetoric about threat that oversimplifies the situation runs the risk of stigmatizing an entire social group, provoking solidarity, and making the politicized Salafist movement seem more important. Knowledge about Salafism and jihadism must be systematically promoted and made more accessible through exchanges of data, subject to protection of privacy. However, long-term preventative work in the education system is probably the most important lever in coming to terms with Salafism and the jihadist movement.

*2.10. Right-wing terrorism (Daniela Pisoiu)*

Terrorism is a highly contentious concept. Right-wing terrorism is more than simply terrorism plus right-wing ideology or hate crime plus plotting the crime. It displays special characteristics of several kinds: in its relationship to the state, in its choice of targets, and in the absence of publicity, which in turn has an effect on its public perception. Empirically speaking, there has been an increase in Germany for several years, both in the severity and in the number of right-wing extremist violent attacks. At the same time, there are signs that the number of right-wing terrorist groups is growing. While the attention of the public and the state in connection with open right-wing terrorism seems to be increasing, “more modern” forms of expression of radical right-wing extremism are gaining ground in the center of society.